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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the current stance of multiculturalism and diversity in
Europe by taking a closer look at the perception of Muslims in the United
Kingdom and France. It is a comparative study that analyzes the sentiments of
nationalism along with how a series of pivotal events that have impacted the
integration process of the Muslim populations. A look at certain key factors such
as cultural and identity clashes, increasing instability in the Middle East and the
influence of the media, demonstrates a rise in Islamophobia in Europe. By
focusing on how the rise in Islamophobia has affected the perception of Muslim
immigrants, the current level of acceptance is shown to be lacking. The UK shows
how, even with a background in nationalism that is used to accepting diversity, a
rise in anti-Muslim sentiment makes it step away from a politics of
multiculturalism. Whereas, France’s emphasis on secularism and its connection to
French culture and nationhood, slows down the acceptance of diversity, while
rising Islamophobia makes it even harder for Muslim immigrants to find a place in
French society.
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CHAPTER 1:
Introduction

Europe has been waging an internal battle against a rising tide of nativist
nationalism emerging as a challenge to multiculturalism. The rise in nativism is due to a
multitude of factors, primarily owing to an increase in security threats and economic
concerns, both of which are connected to a concern over the perceived increase in
immigrant populations. Most specifically, Islamist terrorism is seen as the highest source
of threat;1 which has contributed to a rise in negative attitudes towards the Muslim
populations in Europe. This has raised many questions about the current position of
multiculturalism and tolerance.
The direction of global politics has taken a prominent shift; the advance of
globalization is decreasing. Islamist terrorism has been linked to many cases such as, the
7/7 attacks in London, the Charlie Hebdo incident and most recently, as a contributing
factor to Brexit—all of which indicates a clear message; there has been a rise in antiMuslim sentiment, more profoundly referred to as Islamophobia, which seems to be
rendering attempts at cohesion futile. As many scholars have already stated, if
multiculturalism does exist in European countries today, it appears to be a failure. 2 This
paper will define multiculturalism as the co-existence of several different ethnic groups
within one society, all able to perform their own diversity and live heterogeneously in

1

Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, “Europe’s Experience in Countering Radicalization: Approaches and
Challenges,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 7, no. 2 (2012): 163.
2

Esther Romeyn, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Spectropolitics and Immigration,” Theory, Culture and
Society 31, no. 6 (2014): 79.

1

one country.3 The concept and definition of Islamophobia will be thoroughly discussed
within the methodology section.
Due to the movement of people into Europe over the past several decades,
because of economic or safety reasons, it has become an undeniable fact that many
European countries are now much more diverse than they have historically been.4
Although, (before the Syrian refugee crisis) Muslim immigration did not show a
paramount increase in comparison to immigration from other religious groups, the
perception that they represented much of the increase was persistent. 5 This perception
stemmed from the visibility of minority groups, especially those that were frequently
linked to violence and war in the media. Moreover, many Muslims, because of their skin
colour or particular Islamic dress tended to be more visible, and easier to identify as
‘outsiders’.6
Even though the Muslim populations in Europe come from diverse backgrounds
they are grouped together under a single identity based on their religion. There is no other
group of immigrants in Europe that are categorized primarily for their religious
affiliation.7 Placing all Muslims under one category has served to address them as a
whole in public discourse and public policy concerns. It is an indicator of the presence of

3

Shireen Mazari, “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe,” Policy Perspectives 7, no. 1 (2010): 91.

4

Mazari, “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe,” 91.

5

Phillip Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 11 (2014):
2066.
6

Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2066.

7

Jose Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism: Islam in Europe Catholicism in the United States,” Philosophy
and Social Criticism 34, no. 4-5 (2012): 489.

2

anti-Muslim sentiment in European societies. Furthermore, treating Muslims as one
group is part of a grand development through which limits and subject positions are made
and disputed under the guise of racial politics that creates difference out of both
biological and ethnic indicators.8 The isolation of a minority group, like the Muslims,
reflects the issues over the acceptance of diversity in Europe, which will be further
analyzed within this paper.
Literature Review
There has been a vast amount of literature looking at the problems of
multiculturalism and Islamophobia in Europe. Some of the literature is more general and
aims to cover a specific idea within the broader context of Europe,9 while other literature
provides a more focused case study of specific countries10. Some of the frameworks
through which the literature engages with the topic are through defining diversity and
citizenship,11 by looking at the ideological struggle between nationalism and
integration,12 and as a policy centered analysis over securitization.13

8

David Tyrer and Salman Sayyid, “Governing Ghosts: Race, Incorporeality and Difference in Post-Political
Times,” Current Sociology 60, no. 3 (2012): 355.
9

For example look at, Erik Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” The International Spectator 48,
no. 1 (2013): 102-116; Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and
Policy,” The British Sociological Review 55, no. 2 (2004): 237-257; Alexander C. Jeffrey, “Struggling Over
the Mode of Incorporation: Backlash Against Multiculturalism in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no.
4 (2013): 531-556.
10

For example look at, Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason, “The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia; AntiMuslim Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2011,” Journal of Sociology 43, no 1 (2007):
61-86; Jeremy Gunn, “Religion and Law in France: Secularism, Separation and State Intervention,” Drake
Law Review 57 (2009): 949-984; Maxim Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism. ‘Diversity Statistics and the
Race Issue in Contemporary France,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 17, no. 2 (2014): 118-133.
11

See, Steven Vertovec, “Super-diversity and its Implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 6 (2007):
1024-1054; Didier Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism: A convergence in Progress?”
Journal of Intercultural Studies 32, no. 3 (2011): 229-243; Matthias Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim
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Diversity and Citizenship
Some works focus on immigration to describe diversity and the Muslim
experience. Connor expands the study on the theoretical claim of immigrant diversity by
quantifying it. He draws from Vertovec’s concept of “super-diversity” to explain how the
origins of immigrant populations are becoming more and more diverse.14 His results
suggest that although immigrant diversity is high in most European countries, their
origins and religious backgrounds remain stable.15 He further suggests that some
immigration trends may encounter a change in the future if older generations go back to
their origins,16 although, this seems to be a dubious assessment.
On the other hand, Vertovec provides a theoretical look at the diversification of
diversity by specifically focusing on the case of the United Kingdom. With his paper
published in the late 2000s, Vertovec coins the term “super-diversity” in order to draw
the attention of policy makers and academics to the ethnic origins and other factors of
diversity within immigrant communities that should be taken under account when

Migrants in Western Nation-States- A Comparison of the United Kingdom, France and Germany,” Journal
of International Migration and Integration 6, no. 2 (2005): 219-234.
12

See, Chris Allen, “‘Down with Multiculturalism, Book-burning and Fatwas’: The Discourse of the Death
of Multiculturalism,” Culture and Religion 8, no. 2 (2007): 125-138; Nadia Kiwan, Identities, Discourses and
Experiences: Young People of North African Origin in France (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2009); Ahmet Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe: Analyzing French Exceptionalism,”
Comparative Politics (2008): 1-19.
13

See, Jocelyne Cesari, “Securitization of Islam in Europe,” Die Weltz Islams 52 (2012): 430-449; Leslie S.
Lebl, “Radical Islam in Europe,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (2010): 46-60.
14

Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2056.

15

Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2066.

16

Connor, “Quantifying Immigrant Diversity,” 2059.
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addressing these groups.17 His aim is to change the way in which diversity is perceived
and studied. Thus, “super-diversity” is defined as a multi-faceted perspective on
diversity.18 Vertovec further highlights that new immigrants have a tendency to settle in
the areas where other immigrants of their origin are already established.19 This could be
contributing to why certain immigrant groups have a harder time integrating into
mainstream culture.
Lack of assimilation is observed in other literature that attempts to explain why
this is the case in Europe. Casanova, places the blame on secular European cultures that
have constructed a limit to their level of toleration.20 He claims that immigrants falling
into the Muslim category are from several different ethnic origins, yet referred to with
one classification, when other immigrants are not placed under similar restraints.21
Casanova also mentions that this is a relatively new phenomenon which did not exist a
few decades ago. Although, he does not discuss how this could be an indication that
Islamophobia has increased or what the corresponding factors may be.
Other works provide a comparative analysis between the UK and France, focusing
on their response to diversity. Earlier analyses on these countries point towards their
differences in toleration towards diversity. Drawing the conclusion that minority religious
groups, such as the Muslims, experienced a great deal of resistance from a highly

17

Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1025.

18

Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1026.

19

Vertovec, “Super-diversity,” 1041.

20

Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism,” 490.

21

Casanova, “The Politics of Nativism,” 489.
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centralized and secular French state, whereas, the UK has shown a more liberal model of
toleration.22 On the other hand, this literature notes that a ‘multicultural’ model of
citizenship has entered Western Europe, which could lead to more integration of religious
groups.23
More literature looks at the how diversity has been defined through policy.
Lassalle’s article provides further comparison by discussing the policy framework behind
the inclusion and incorporation of minority groups. He explains that in order to deal with
race inequalities, British policy is developed on the framework of multiculturalism and
acceptance of pluralism.24 On the other hand, French policy is drawn up with a focus on
the concept of laïcité (secularism),25 which for this issue, looks specifically at citizenship
and integration.26 Lasselle claims that although these countries started out with differing
perspectives, in later years their outlooks have converged and their laws are now more
similar on a lot of issues regarding access to citizenship and immigration. 27 He displays a
positive perspective towards a convergence and acceptance of diversity. Although, these
works make a timely comparison of the countries’ stance on diversity from the mid2000s to the end of 2010, more recent occurrences in politics and policies (which will be
expanded on within this paper) in these countries begs to question if the positive attitude
towards a ‘unity in diversity’ is still present in the UK and France of today.
22

Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants,” 227.

23

Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants,” 230.

24

Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 230.

25

This term will be defined further in the third chapter.

26

Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 230.

27

Lassalle, “French Laicite and British Multiculturalism,” 240.
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Some scholars have linked the conceptualization of modern French citizenship to
the post-1980s immigration discussions.28 Ideas of French nationhood have been tied to
‘homogeneity’ and ‘continuity’.29 Moreover, many scholars have depended on the ideas
of Charles Taylor to expand on the idea of nationalism and secularism in France. These
ideas are rooted in the French revolution of 1789, which is also where Gunn argues that
laïcité has come from. He also compares the laws on secularism between France and the
US, drawing parallels on a similar conception of secularism and separation between the
state and the church.
Nationalism and Integration
As immigration and diversity within previously homogenous European societies
has increased there has been a backlash in the form of nationalist tendencies. The
literature on this topic highlights the concerns of economic and cultural capital, as well as
the perceivably increasing amount of terrorist activity arising from Islamic groups.30
Thus, Islamophobia is considered as a leading variable in the surge of nationalism. In a
similar light, Allen argues that nationalistic debates over tolerance, liberalism and
secularism are imbued with disguised anti-Muslim sentiments.31 His analysis agrees with
the vast amount of literature that claims there are limits in the European landscape when
it comes to acceptance.

28

Maxim Silverman, “Citizenship and the Nation-State in France,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 14, no. 3
(1991): 333.
29

Silverman, “Citizenship and the Nation-State in France,” 336.

30

Yunis Alam and Charles Husband, “Islamophobia, Community Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism Policies
in Britain,” Patterns of Prejudice 47, no. 3 (2013): 235-252.
31

Allen, “‘Down with Multiculturalism,” 127.
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Subsequently, many scholars point to a deeper problem in European
multiculturalism; which is the struggle over identity. This draws back on even older
debates concerning the European Union and its reluctance to accept Turkey. This is due
to Turkey’s Muslim culture not being seen as European.32 Jones argues that politics of a
nation-state naturally depend on the creation of an imagined community.33 Therefore
implying that nationalism is part of the equation that keeps European states cohesive.
However, he presents a constructive argument aiming to reconcile the problems
associated with integration of minorities in Europe. Jones is positive that a reconstruction of the European identity to be inclusive of diversity is the solution to the
problem, for which end he offers several suggestions.
There has been a multitude of academic discussion on the multicultural nature of
the UK, especially with a focus on the British Muslim experience. Some of the top
scholars on this topic, such as Tariq Modood and Amir Saeed, have been examining the
meaning of British nationalism and belonging in the UK since the early 1990s. Some of
the literature argues that multiculturalism in a society comes as a celebration and addition
to national identity as opposed to a threat. From this perspective, multiculturalism is a
form of globalization and acceptance towards diversity. Modood notes that the idea of the
British “gentleman” is not too dissimilar to the model of a good Muslim.34 He addresses
the core of the identity problem as being exclusionary towards religions that are not Euro-

32

Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” 103.

33

Jones, “Identity, Solidarity and Islam in Europe,” 104.

34

Tariq Modood, Not Easy Being British: Colour, Culture and Citizenship (London: Trentham Books
Limited, 1992), 3.

8

centric and Christian-centric, which automatically excludes Islam.35 Modood further
points out that the problem is multifaceted, as minority groups tend to cling onto group
identities, and as a result, not place enough emphasis on commonalities that come with a
common nationality.36
Similarly, Saeed argues that Muslims are seen as ‘un-British,’ as is exacerbated
because of the influence of the media and the general research in the UK that points to
non-whites being separate from British identity.37 This is because of what Modood
clarifies to be “cultural racism,” which in the European context is explained to be
hostility directed to a “racialized” or “racially marked group” because their culture is
seen as alien to the norm of the country.38 These have led to the modern crisis of identity,
which Poole blames on the media.39 Moreover, she argues that the media has played a
large role in destabilizing the multiculturalism in the UK.40 She’s not the only scholar
who thinks that British multiculturalism might be experiencing a downfall, as Joppke also
argues that multicultural policies have been retreating and being replaced by centrist
policies.41

35

Modood, Not Easy Being British, 4.

36

Modood, Not Easy Being British, 4-5.

37

Amir Saeed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the
Media,” Sociology Compass 1 (2007): 444.
38

Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2005), 11.
39

Elizabeth Poole, “The Case of Geert Wilders: Multiculturalism, Islam and Identity in the UK,” Journal of
Religion in Europe 5 (2012): 162.
40

Poole, “The Case of Geert Wilders,” 162.

41

Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 243.

9

Other works focus on the study of nationalism in France by painting a more
comprehensive picture of the different political parties’ stances on the main topics of
dispute within the public sphere.42 Kiwan shows that the moderate left has been
influenced by the political discourse of the right, especially on topics relating to the
integration of minority groups. However, Kiwan does not provide a focused analysis on
the experiences of the Muslim population. This is covered by many other scholars, some
of which place an emphasis on the institutional discrimination of the Muslim
communities in France.43 Whilst also drawing a comparison between the French and
British reactions to Muslims, arguing that Britain has been the most accommodating to
their Muslim populations.44 Subsequently, other scholars have argued that ‘race issues’
were commonly avoided in France; with the word ‘diversity’ only entering the public
discourse in the 2000s.45
Securitization and Policy
To provide an explanation for Islamophobia and the counter-terrorist measures
which have escalated in the European states, some scholars have addressed the concept of
“securitization”46 Cesari adds to the literature on securitization by expanding the concept
to mean more than just speech acts.47 She argues that securitization happens in subtle

42

Kiwan, Identity, Discourse and Experience.

43

Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies and Muslim Experiences in Europe”.

44

Kuru, “Secularism, State Policies and Muslim Experiences in Europe,” 3.

45

Cervulle, “The Use of Universalism,” 118.

46

Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 430-449.

47

Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 433.

10

ways through policy making and institutions.48 This demonstrates the general anti-Islamic
sentiment in Europe and regularly impedes on their religious freedoms and civil liberties,
in an otherwise, liberal Western Europe. This framework illustrates that Islamophobia has
created a link between Islam and violence; and clearly blames Europe for accepting this
mindset.
Other literature further blames European governments for the lack of Muslim
integration in Western societies.49 Lebl argues that it is because some European
governments allow the cultivation of ‘radical Islam’.50 This is done through a lack of
governing policy in certain neighbourhoods with high concentrations of immigrants. This
results in the perpetuation of their own Islamic values over “European values,” which
impedes their ability to assimilate properly.51 This view draws a large stroke over the
diversity in Muslim cultures and appears to equate radical Islam with ‘normal’ Islam.
Background on the Theory Literature
The theory that will be used to explain my analysis is based on identity politics.
This theory draws heavily from its philosophical roots, and has diverged in more
contemporary times towards different areas of study including: political science, history,
sociology and humanities. Within these areas of study there are further classifications that
fall under the theory of identity formation such as: gender, class, sexuality, and race.
Most literature classifies that identity politics has arisen under the liberal democratic
48

Cesari, “Securitization of Islam,” 433.

49

Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 46-60.

50

Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 47.

51

Lebl, “Radical Islam,” 47.
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system and is affected by the underpinnings of liberal ideology. Visible social identity is
used to divide and suppress groups of people.52 More recently, identity politics has
become an essential part of political discourse and poses definitive implications on
political inclusivity, definitions of self-identity and the potential for national unity and
resistance.
The formation of identity is affected by a multitude of intersectional variables
including; gender, racial and ethnic background, religious and political beliefs, sexuality,
class et cetera. Intersectionality looks at the multilayered and complex nature of people’s
multiple identities and how they experience discrimination.53 However, the focus of my
paper will be on racial and cultural discrimination (which, in the case of Islamophobia, is
linked to religion as well). This is because, the emphasis of my paper is on discrimination
based on religion, thus although the effects of self-identification from various other
sources cannot be ignored, racial and cultural classification is the most relevant category
when studying diversity and multiculturalism in a society. Moreover, the scope of my
paper does not permit me to look at all the variables of identity.
This look at the literature will provide a historical preview of the relevant works
in racial and ethnic identity theories, divided by the focus of the research. A vast amount
of the research that initiated the academic discussion on identity politics, particularly with
regards to race, has originated in the United States. The US has provided a fertile ground
for the study and analysis of race dynamics because it has a well-known history of racism

52

Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.

53

Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against
Women of Colour,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1242-1243.
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in slavery and amongst large immigrant populations, such as the Latin Americans.
Intersectionality of identity with regards to race usually comes with gender as well, for
this reason my review will also cover some of the more important works in this field.
Identity Theory and Philosophy
This review will cover the works in the field of identity politics by starting with
the general category of identity formations with a focus on race and ethnicity. The study
of racial identity theory is generally linked to notions of nationalism and how they work
together. The earlier works in this literature owe a lot to philosophy. Especially to
philosophers such as Frantz Fanon and Michel Foucault who have, respectively, written
about race and sexuality.54
Fanon’s writing on the black struggle to define their identity within postcolonial
France in the 1950s sets the precedent for understanding “dislocation” and “separation”
of one’s own racial identity.55 Fanon blames French colonialism in Africa for the
disconnection between the French identity and African- French identity.56 He further
highlights the importance of language, and a culture cultivated around that language;
which creates barriers for integration and diversity for those who struggle to speak the
language.57 Fanon argues that acceptance of one culture—more specifically, the way of
speaking one language—is, in essence, the rejection of the other culture.58 As he says

54

See, Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York:Grove Press 1967) and Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality; Volume I: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
55

Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 25.

56

Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 18.

57

Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 28.
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about the colonized black man leaving his “mother country” and moving to more
“civilized” France; “He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness,”59
Similarly, Foucault’s writing places an emphasis on language and its effect on the
formation of identity. However, Foucault focuses on sex and how it has historically been
a repressed subject, which has resulted in the repression of the people and their identity.
He links sexual repression to a Marxist view of class struggle. In this way, Foucault
outlines how the empowerment of sexual expression and identity is linked to politics and
power. His work, The History of Sexuality, is also seen as one of the originators in the
thought that sexual identity, especially homosexuality, is a product of genealogy.60
Racial Theory
The theory on the formation of race as a part of identity is explained through
philosophical and sociological frameworks, with some scholars also explaining the
particular situation and disadvantage of certain groups. Some scholars aim to portray a
general understanding of race as a group identity.61 Blumer describes race as a collective
group.62 His theory goes further into how prejudice occurs and accelerates within a
collective group mentality. This theory links the formation of racial identity to notions of
nationalism, similar to Fanon’s theory. One race is made to feel superior and distinctive

58

Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 18

59

Fanon, Black Skin White Masks, 18.

60

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 43.

61

Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position” The Pacific Sociological Review 1, no. 1
(1958), 3-7.
62

Blumer, “Race Prejudice,” 4.
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in comparison to the others and this leads to an isolated definition of self, which is based
on differences.63 Thus contributing to understanding how nationalism can rise alongside
discrimination and segregation.
Nationalist notions are a vast part of what defines racial identity politics, most
especially in the US. Identity politics in the US initially provides an analysis of African
American racial and national identity. Prominent scholars, such as Omi and Winant,
identify the white settlers and slave owners as systematically placing the concept of
“race” in America.64 Thus, the concept of “race” forms based on oppression and violence,
and evolves in a trajectory leading to segregation. Race ideology comes with a set of
“racial beliefs” and “racial etiquette” often based on a number of stereotypes.65 This
ideology advances the thought of race as a natural and almost “scientific” division of
people.66 “Racial formations” are then used as political tools to suppress. This view on
identity looks at the sociological creation of race and its political implications.
The discussion of race and identity is further contextualized by Alcoff, who
brings in the importance of class and sex, to the question of race. Alcoff argues that the
mere visibility of certain physical qualities automatically classifies one’s identity in
society and therefore their privilege or lack thereof. She further states that capitalism
perpetuates a racial system of wealth and a materialistic society that can only see what is

63

Blumer, “Race Prejudice,” 4.

64

Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formations in the United States: From 1960s to 1990s (New
York: Routledge, 1994).
65

Omi and Winant, Racial Formations, 6.

66

Omi and Winant, Racial Formations, 6.
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“visible” as the truth.67 This perspective puts an emphasis on physical appearance, as an
identifier of race and ethnicity. It also brings forth the notion of second-hand racism and
the ability to “pass” as a different race or ethnicity. Alcoff’s discussion is rooted in the
Hispanic experience of racism in the US.
But visibility as a criterion of discrimination has another side; invisibility in the
race, one feels as though, they belong. “Passing” is then another form of racial
segregation.68 For instance, passing for white, which could come as a privilege in some
cases, actually leads to a deeper form of isolation.69 This is because the person that passes
as a race outside of their own is then excluded from both races. Piper explains her own
experience in this regard; perceived as white from the black community and seen as white
from the white community until they became aware
of her roots.70 In cases similar to this one, the sense of belonging one is told they must
feel towards a particular race (and group) is skewed and identity formation is fractured.
“Whiteness” as a privilege is further elaborated in other works that emphasize its
value in society.71 “White power” and “white supremacy” as a socially constructed
concept that both, those passing as white, and those not passing as white partake in.72
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Thus, categorizing race in culture besets structural consequences for different groups.73
This argument brings to light the significance of not only “race” but also “space”. From
Lipsitz analysis the US is especially prone to an investment in whiteness because of its
racialized history.74 Thus, the “space,” which in this case is America, is central to her
argument, though the core of her argument could also be applied to different locations.
This argument is similar to Fanon’s discussion of colonized cultures and how they create
a future of racial classification that excludes and discriminates.75
However, “race” fails to have a biological explanation. As Noel Ignatiev says,
“the only race is the human race.”76 Thus as a social concept whiteness can be redefined
in any way to exclude or include anyone, regardless of actual skin colour, as was seen in
the case of the early Irish immigrants to the US. Thus, through his analysis Ignatiev’s
discussion links racial identification to class position in society, while emphasizing the
connection between class and race in identity theory.
Identity of Race and Sex
The discussion of identity theory would be incomplete without the brief mention
of its intersectional connectedness to gender and class. Class features as a prominent
background explanation in the literature on racial theory. Gender (or sex) on the other
hand, is often interconnected to the struggle of internal identity. In the case of racial

73

Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness, 2.

74

Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness, 7.

75

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York:Grove Press, 1963).

76

Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge 1995), 1.

17

minorities, sex is usually ignored, and leads to an identity that is even further
disadvantaged in society.
An example of this struggle can be seen in the literature explaining the
phenomenon that excludes black women from the discourse on racial identity, and from
the discussion on feminism.77 The main scholars in this field have argued that there is
multidimensionality to the experience of a black woman (as opposed to a black man),
which has been ignored by both society and academia for some time.78 The focus in the
literature draws attention to the most privileged of the races, classes or sexes, and thus
further disadvantages those who are “multi-burdened”.79 This concept is further discussed
by Julie Bettie,80 who argues that schools routinely exclude certain cultures and
languages which discriminate against girls of colour.
William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox
The theory I will be working with in my paper will mainly come from William
Connolly’s, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.81
Connolly’s book is an important addition to the theory on identity politics and is well
cited by many scholars. In this book Connolly provides a qualitative study with an
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interpretive framework in order to present a comprehensive theory on the formation of
identity. He addresses that this is not a creation of a completely new theory; instead it is
to provide an understanding of what Connolly observes to be a paradox in identity
politics.82 He uses an interpretative approach to analyze how philosophy can be used to
explain this paradox. In essence, it is still a theory generating methodology because
Connolly attempts to answer why identity is formed from differences and contemplates
the resulting political ramifications.
Although the book is heavily saturated in liberal political thought and argues that
modern identity politics is driven from liberalism, it also raises theological and ethical
concerns with the problem of identity and difference. More specifically, Connolly wants
to address how entrenched identities use ‘difference’ in order to supersede their ethical
concerns. He then reflects on how identity is formed from this contradiction and the
political implications of it.
Connolly divides his arguments into seven chapters. He starts by posing the
theological question of evil; ‘the problem of evil’ as he describes it, is the inescapable
injustices of life.83 Connolly positions this problem within the concepts of freedom and
responsibility and proceeds to expand its implications with regards to the individual,
personally and collectively. His argument then moves towards the political realm, more
specifically, to take a deeper look at international politics.
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He explores how the concept of “otherness” entered the political discourse by
referring to Tzvetan Todorov’s, The Conquest of America. The ethical dilemma centered
in Todorov’s philosophy allows Connolly to create a bridge between the theological
dilemma raised in the first chapter and the political implications discussed in the second
chapter and onwards. By providing an analysis of Todorov’s conclusions Connolly is
able to delve deeper into the theory of identity and pose questions on how the conception
of identity has formed and functioned in political literature. He expands on how identity
of Western (Christian) society in general was formed through invasions and
conversions.84 Highlighting that identity is linked to tolerance and the community, which
under further analysis means, it comes with its own self-interests.85 Thus, within
international political strife, every country (community) is bound to fall back on its own
self-interests, which makes international conflict resolution difficult.86 Therefore,
‘identity’ is central to the study of international relations. Connolly then examines how
the formation of collective identity superimposes a normalization of differences and
concedes to neutralization of them in national discourse.
The discussion on how global political discourse developed leads to Connolly’s
main argument, which this paper will use as a basis and expand further on. Connolly
provides a phenomenology on how personal identity is established and how it functions
within the collective. In essence, Connolly argues that identity is constructed through a
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collection of socially normalized differences.87 Thus, identity requires difference in order
to exist and thrive.88 However, in liberal societies a dual contradiction exists. This is the
difference between liberal individualism and liberal individuality. Connolly argues that
liberalism in society aims to establish a ‘normal’ individual; this individual is created
using a series of conventions and norms.89 In contrast to this, individuality espouses to
create an identity in protest against the ‘normal’ identity.90 Thus, there is a ‘hegemony of
identity’ which is normalized, and naturally, excludes diversity and anything that which
is outside of its norm.91 Connolly further argues that humans are unable to escape the
need to be a part of a collective, which will always come with its set of common rules
and customs.92
In later chapters, Connolly returns to the ethical concerns with which he started
his arguments and addresses how ethical concerns are central to identity politics. He
argues that in the creation of standards for the “true” shared identity within a political
bloc, one must include responsibility. That is to say, the problem of normalized identities
comes from their lack of responsibility and apathy towards the evils that result from the
acceptance of one identity. Therefore, the solution is to insert a sense of responsibility
towards what may not be accepted or whatever evil may come from having one standard
identity in a society.
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Connolly then further reviews how identity functions in a democracy and how
territorial claims have alienating effects. This is because democracy works best within a
state that has clear territorial boundaries and every state endorses a collective identity.
Subsequently, a collective identity is inherently exclusionary.93 Thus, the state is
responsible for the creation of its own marginalized, perhaps criminalized, groups.
Connolly concludes by providing possible political solutions to the problems of identity
he addresses throughout his book.
Identity/Difference provides a theoretical analysis that can be used to demonstrate
how identity politics can explain the problems arising from diversity within a state. This
paper will use Connolly’s theories as a stable to analyze the particular situation within
each of the case studies.
Methodology
This paper will answer the research questions;
a) How have European countries responded to the rise of diversity, arising from an
increase of the Muslim populations within their borders?
b) Why is the rise of Islamophobia concurrent to the rise of diversity?
In order to provide an answer to these questions a comparative historical analysis
will be conducted with a focus on two case studies; the United Kingdom and France. The
time frame for this analysis will be from World War Two to the present. There will be a
specific focus on this time period because immigration experienced a large spike after
WWII due to a higher need for workers in these countries, as well as elsewhere in
93

Connolly, Identity/Difference, 199.

22

Europe.94 Therefore, the more homogenous European populations started to truly become
‘diverse’ after this period, making it ideal to study the evolution of diversity from WWII
onwards.
The research questions will be analyzed in the following ways;
a) How Europe has responded will be studied by looking at pivotal historical
events and how they inspired a changed in the perception of the Muslims
within these states.
b) Why Islamophobia has arisen along with diversity will be analyzed by
looking at the three reasons;
1. Cultural and identity clashes between European cultures and Muslim
culture
2. Increasing rise of instability in the Middle East and wars
3. The role of the media in elevating these two issues
My hypothesis for this research question is that a clash of cultures and identities
between the Muslim population and, historically Christian, and secular Europeans has led
to a rise in identity politics; hence a lack of acceptance towards diversity.
The following key terms are central to the analysis which will be conducted in
this paper and they will be further defined. ‘Diversity’, or ‘super-diversity’ (a term coined
by Vertovec),95 is understood to encompass many different forms of diversity including,
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religion, gender, age, origin, language, skill set and immigration status.96 However, this
paper will look at immigrant origins with a particular focus on religious diversity as the
most significant diversifying point. The manifestation of the diversity defined here, with
regards to each case study, will be further assessed in the later chapters.
It is important to distinctly define the forms of racism and discrimination that this
paper will examine. It is argued that the conceptualization of race and racism, along with
racial inequality has historically been defined in limited terms.97 It is too dependent on
the black-white relationship which is based on the, “Atlantic slavery triangle of Western
Europe-West Africa- America.”98 Although, this dualist view of racism has progressed, it
is still the classical view and remains resilient within the literature. Modood refers to this
dualist perspective on racism as ‘colour racism’ and explains how it does not work for
Asian immigrants in Europe.99
Drawing on Modood’s perspective, I will expand the definition to include Muslim
immigrants in Europe, and how this dualist view is inadequate for them as well. Modood
describes, ‘cultural racism’, defined as a “racialized image” that “appeals to cultural
motifs such as language, religion, family structure, exotic dress, cuisine and art forms.”100
Thus, under this framework ethnic groups are treated as ‘alien’ and undesirable, with
these motifs used to discriminate and harass them as a group and to justify treating them
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negatively.101 Furthermore, it is important to note that the Muslim populations within
Europe are a diverse group of people from different countries and cultures. As a diverse
group, Muslims experience both, a ‘colour racism’ and ‘cultural racism’. Thus, their
experiences are nuanced and Islamophobia is one umbrella under which discrimination
against them can be studied. It should be noted that Islamophobia is a slightly
controversial term, defined differently by various scholars. As a loaded term it is argued
that it can be used in problematic ways.102 However, this does not justify the denial of the
existence of the term.103 Given the rise of anti-immigration sentiments and policies
directly targeting Muslims, along with the historical discrimination and disadvantages
experienced by Muslims in the West, it is undeniable that there is racism directed at all
those who are (perceived to be) Muslim. Thus, Islamophobia is an efficient and profound
way in which to explain the condition and perception of Islam and Muslims in the West.
Although the term has existed since before the terrorist attacks on the twin towers
in 2001, it has gained more visibility and legitimacy in the post- 9/11 world.104 Many
scholars have defined it broadly as racism against Muslims,105 with a view of Islam as
violent and hostile. This paper will agree with this definition and further define
Islamophobia as Islam being perceived as a uniform bloc that is separate from other
cultures, inferior to the West, a violent political ideology, engaged and justified in its
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discrimination and exclusion of Muslims from society, and its normalization of these
hostile thoughts and behaviours.106
The comparative analysis I will undergo will be based on two case studies, the
United Kingdom and France. My reasons for choosing these two countries to compare is
due to their geographic proximity, which presents a unique situation where they are both
influenced by events that happen in the other country yet they have developed through
separate histories and have thus created different frameworks for handling diversity.
More specifically, they hold some of the largest Muslim populations in Europe.107
Furthermore, these are two of the most powerful countries in Europe and a desired
location for many present and future immigrants and refugees, meaning their diversity
(especially with regards to Muslims) could increase significantly.
With a rise in extreme Islamic terrorism and ongoing conflict in Syria, this study
hopes to situate the position of diversity in the UK and France. It is a timely project that
aims to shed light on the perception of Muslims and their level of belonging in these
countries, with the hopes of furthering and enhancing the discourse on diversity in
Europe. Although, there are limits to this study, as it is based solely on secondary
literature I am limited to what is already available. The abundance on literature on these
topics means there is a struggle over deconstructing different frameworks in order to
reconstruct them within my paper in a coherent manner. Moreover, there must be caution
exercised over the biases which are present within every scholars work.
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CHAPTER 2:
Multiculturalism and Identity in the United Kingdom
“Take back control,” was the infamous slogan of the Leave campaign, and
following its advice Britain took an exit from the EU. Brexit could represent the symbolic
start to the end of globalization discussions. The era of supranational identities and
celebrating diversity seems to be ending, while right wing nationalism is on the rise—in
Europe and other countries all over the world. The case of the United Kingdom
demonstrates how, after years of growth in immigration and diversity, instead of moving
towards a better model of acceptance and inclusivity, there has been a push in the
opposite direction.
Brexit became successful regardless of Scotland voting to ‘remain.’ This along
with the larger “population” concerns show how Britain is moving towards disunity. One
of the main issues in the campaign to leave the European Union was on the role of
demography.108 Along with the movement of peoples to and from the UK, were also
socio-economic interests. These concerns were driven by the ‘free movement of workers’
within the EU, and the perception that jobs and money were being lost to non-UK born
workers.109 Although economic issues played a role, it has been argued that the core of
the problem went much deeper. “Take back control” was aimed at the topic where the
public felt the most unease—immigration. Concerns about borders and incoming
refugees and immigrants bred an atmosphere of fear, fueled by the crisis in the Middle
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East and the potential ‘threat’ of Turkey joining the EU.110 Issues such as the strife in
Syria were presented as a security and demographic menace in the Leave campaign.111
The concern that Turkey would suddenly enter the EU exacerbated the dangers from the
Middle East, as well as creating further questions on the identity of Europe. From the
perspective of the Leave campaigners, the ideal future of Europe was at risk.112 As
Kauffman argues, at its core, Brexit was motivated by identity politics.113
At a Security Conference in Munich in February of 2011, Prime Minister, David
Cameron, delivered a speech that addressed the failure of diversity in Britain; “Under the
doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate
lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a
society to which they feel they want to belong.”114 These few lines highlight the lack of
acceptance of multicultural communities in the UK. Moreover, the fact that this was a
speech given at a conference on security issues, demonstrates that there is a perceived
threat arising from multiculturalism, and in particular from Muslims.
The history of the rise of diversity in Britain is fraught with a similar malaise.
This chapter will analyze the current status of multiculturalism in the UK by focusing on
the acceptance of its Muslim population. This will be done by identifying and analyzing
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certain key moments in history that have had large impacts on the perception of Muslims
in British culture and life. Firstly, in order to analyze how a nation, such as the UK, can
be multicultural while maintaining its diversity under a single national identity, it is
essential to understand the historical roots of the concept of Britishness and how its past
affects its current form. Followed by the breakdown of the pivotal events that have
occurred throughout the decades following the rise of immigration. These specific events
were chosen because they show a clear transformation in the opinion of the society and
provide markers for understanding how Islamophobia has revealed itself in the UK today.
The manifestation of Islamophobia in the UK will be viewed under the British political
context, which places an importance on immigration and border control, the local issues
over limited resources which appear on the local and national news, and are then abused
by nationalist politics.115 “Ethnicization of Islam is actually part of a wider process
through which boundaries and subject positions are ascribed and contested within the
context of a racial politics that circumscribes appeals to both biological and cultural
(ethnic) registers for expressing difference.”116
The events that created a change in the British opinion will be identified as the
following; firstly, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973. This event illustrates how the British
awareness of Muslim immigrants shifted from seeing them merely as different peoples to
disliked peoples. Secondly, the Rushdie affair of 1989 further transforms the image of
Muslims into hostile people that are threatening to society. The influence and importance
of the media in the rise of Islamophobia can also be observed in this early case.
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Subsequently, the Gulf-War of 1990, coming in the wake of the Rushdie affair, expedites
the antagonizing and alienation of the Muslim settlers. Lastly, the 7/7 London bombings
and the continual escalation of Islamic violence demonstrates the failing nature in the
acceptance of Britain’s Muslim population. Thus, this chapter will argue that, although,
the UK has attempted to embrace its diversity, their ventures have been progressive, but
nevertheless, unreliable and deficient.
History of “Britishness”
The concept of “Britishness” has many different and contradictory aspects. It is
rooted in the idea of a nation-state, which naturally creates an “imagined community” of
people.117 Moreover, nation-states have many different elements such as, geography,
politics, history, culture and economy that come together through a process to create a
single nation.118 A history of conquest and shifting borders also complicates the
relationship of nationality. This is especially true for the case of Britain. British identity
and citizenship has historically come with confusion about its boundaries.119 Thus,
understanding the idea of “Britishness” is central to the concepts of citizenship and
belonging.
The concept of a ‘nation-state’ has inherent contradictions; a state holds power
within geographic boundaries and provides its citizens with certain universal rights,
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whereas, a nation, is the coming together of peoples who have some shared history and
culture.120 Therefore, citizenship is meant to hold universal rights above cultural
differences; however, it only exists within the boundaries of a nation-state which is based
on cultural specificity.121 When a nation-state is being constructed there is spatial
extension, which involves taking in different ethnic and linguistic groups.122 These new
groups are later subjected to the national story of the dominant group. Similarly, the
United Kingdom was constructed through the conquest of England over the other nations
which are now part of its territory.123 Thus, British national identity, which is arguably a
relatively new construct, was superimposed on the previously separate identities of the
English, Welsh, Irish and Scottish.124 Yet, the dominance of the English over the rest of
the ethnic groups is apparent in the name of the national language, supremacy of London,
name of the country and the conditions some groups are held to before they can receive
national belonging.
More specifically, the national language is called English, not British.125 There
have been many attempts to curb other national languages such as Welsh, Gaelic and
Irish. 126 The power of England can also be seen in the economic and political dominion
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of London.127 Moreover, Sales argues that, there is a prevalence in the interchangeable
use of ‘Britain’ and ‘England,’ and some general confusion over the actual name of the
country.128 Along with the common practice of a Scottish or Welsh person being referred
to as British when they are successful, yet remaining Scottish or Welsh if they are not. 129
As Connolly argues, trying to establish an identity over an already established identity
does not work.130 This is because the first identity already holds a certain social space
within the national frame. The troubles of trying to establish a new identity on top of an
existing identity can be further seen in the later attempts to integrate ethnic minorities
into British society.
With regards to the Irish, they have historically held an unclear position within the
British nation. Having been partitioned in 1920, Ireland is Britain’s oldest colony. The
divide between Northern and Southern Ireland, especially with regards to being part of
the union, was never fairly resolved. This divide was in part due to the religious
differences; the south was Protestant and preferred to be a part of the predominantly
Protestant United Kingdom. This led to the construction of the borders of Northern
Ireland with strategic and manipulative tactics.131 The troubling history of acquisition has
bled into the ambiguous nature of the Irish in Britain. Although Irish citizens face much
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economic and social discrimination, they are given full citizenship within Britain, which
has strategic reasons.132
Not only was the British state constructed through England’s domination over the
other nations, it was also created whilst England was colonizing in Africa, the Indian
subcontinent, America and elsewhere. Thus, British identity was constructed through
conquest and supremacy; an empire in which the sun never set.133 The subsequent process
of decolonization has led to the ambiguities within national identity and citizenship.134
Decolonization and the formation of the Commonwealth afforded the previous
colonials entry rights into Britain. This was a symbolic, universal equality bestowed
because Britain felt responsible as the ‘parent’ of the colonized nations.135 However,
when Commonwealth citizens tried to use their rights inside of Britain, they faced
discrimination and animosity.136 The following decades have seen the struggles of ethnic
minorities for full inclusion in the UK.137 As Sales argues, “tensions remain between the
notion of Britain as a place and the concept of ‘British people,’ which is often seen in
more exclusive ethnic terms.”138
OPEC Oil Crisis 1973
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The issues over Britishness and belonging have only exacerbated as immigration,
and thus diversity within the UK has grown. This section will analyze the social and
economic immigration patterns and economic concerns, which affected immigration and
the perception of the incoming ethnic groups. Furthermore, the OPEC Oil Embargo of
1973, and the resulting change in the perception of Muslim minorities will be examined,
with a focus on how perceived identity clashes as well as, instability in the Middle East
slowly begets Islamophobia in the UK.
After the Second World War, the UK, as well as many other European countries,
experienced labour shortages, which resulted in seeking external labour. Some of the
incoming migrants were from other European countries, but majority came from former
colonies, such as India, Pakistan and Jamaica, which had become part of the New
Commonwealth.139 Legislation in 1948 allowed people who were formerly regarded as
subjects of the British Empire, to become citizens of the Commonwealth, which gave
them full rights to reside in Britain.140 It is noteworthy that the arrival of Empire
Windrush in 1948 marked a clear cultural change. This boat brought 492 Jamaican
migrants and symbolized the initiation of two immensely significant factors;141 the mass
postwar immigration into the UK and the influx of visibly different populations.
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By 1951, there was an estimated 218, 000 people of Commonwealth origin in the
UK, this number increased to 541, 000 in ten years.142 Between the years of 1945-1961,
as immigration from the New Commonwealth countries grew, although no legislation had
yet to be established to stop this influx, there was an inauguration in the reconstruction of
Britishness around race.143 Non-white people were seen as ‘alien races’, whose
establishment within the UK threatening the ‘British way of life’.144 Similar to the other
immigrants, Muslims were generalized under the labels, ‘blacks,’ ‘Asians’ and ‘Indians,’
without holding particular attention in the sea of ‘others’.145 Thus, during the early 1950s
and 1960s, it is argued that Muslims were seen as “law-abiding, docile folks” with only
their “colour and ethnicity” as the “problem”.146
As economic stagnation of the 1960s worsened, Commonwealth Immigration Bill
of 1962 was introduced.147 This bill significantly restricted the entry of workers from the
New Commonwealth countries, even though, family reunification continued.148 The
growth in diversity from populations that could visibly be marked as ‘ethnic others,’
along with the economic struggles of the 1960s led to the primary displays of xenophobic
reactions in the UK. This can be seen in the “Rivers of Blood” speech delivered by Enoch
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Powell in 1968, which urged for tighter controls over immigration.149 This led to the
follow up Acts of 1968 and 1971, aimed to further restrict the entry of those not born
within the borders of the UK or who had familial ties in the UK.150 Thus, the 1960s was a
time of reaction against the initial rush and build-up of the mass postwar immigrants. At
this time British policy aspired to assimilate the immigrants into British culture;151 in this
way attempting to dissolve the differences within diverse cultures.
Despite these restrictive Acts, the population of immigrants with Commonwealth
origins rose to 1.1 million by 1971.152 During the midst of these struggles with the rise of
diversity within Britain, was the OPEC oil crisis of 1973. This embargo was the result of
political and economic strategizing of the Organization of Arab Petrol Exporting
Countries (OAPEC), who demanded the evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab
territory, as well as, the restoration of Palestinian rights.153 This embargo was, in part,
caused by the October War between the Israelis and the Arabs in 1973. It translated as the
entry of “oil power” into politics and reflected the dependence of industrialized states on
foreign oil.154 Coming at the end of the postwar economic boom, oil embargo contributed
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to the economic crisis.155 This crisis led to the upsurge in the consumer prices of
petroleum,156 which affected the daily lives of ordinary citizens in the UK.
The oil crisis had an impact on the perception of the Muslims residing in Britain.
Previously seen as merely different and ‘alien’, but otherwise not any different from the
other immigrant groups, they were abruptly singled out from the rest of the ‘others’.
Suddenly, “Muslims were regarded as despotic ogres, dangerous revolutionaries and
violent, treacherous thugs bent on undermining decency and democracy.”157 This was, in
part, due to the portrayal of Muslims throughout European history as depended on the
“desires and fears” that the West cast onto them.158 After the oil crisis, all ‘Muslims’
were thought of as ‘Arabs’, and all ‘Arabs’ seen as deceitful and conniving people.159
This perception was aided by decades of European history that characterized Muslims as
infidels and bloodthirsty barbarians, due partially to, the challenge Muslims presented to
the Crusaders and the invasion of Ottomans into Christian Europe.
Thus, to the background of a rising tide of immigrants that were noticeably
different, came the downfall of the economy and a series of events; including the Six-Day
War in the Middle East and the OPEC oil embargo of the early 1970s. All of which show
that negative changes on the perception of Muslims were starting to permeate into the
attitude of the British. Furthermore, these events demonstrate how instability in the
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Middle East was slowly starting to affect the lives of those living in the West. The
significant change in the impression of the Muslim communities abroad was reflected on
the Muslims within Britain. Transformation in the view of the Muslim populations could
occur, more or less swiftly, because of a history of hostility and ‘othering’ already present
between European and Muslim cultures. Although the oil embargo put the spotlight on
the Muslim populations in the UK, and changed the perception of them from potentially
neutral to disliked, it is noteworthy that they were not seen as ‘dangerous’ until the
Rushdie affair of 1989.
Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War
The spread and rise of Islamophobia in the UK can be attributed largely to the
media, which started to focus more on Muslims at the end of the 1970s. This section will
examine the doctrine of multiculturalism, which began in the 1980s, and how it evolved,
along with the impact of the Rushdie affair on demonstrating cultural barriers between
Muslims and those in the West. Followed by the Gulf War and its significance on further
alienating Muslims from “Britishness”. These vital events, which occurred within a few
short years of each other, became global issues with the aid of the media and contributed
to the rise of Islamophobia.
The 1980s saw the beginnings of what would later be understood as globalization.
There was a shift in the importance given to immigration as a political issue; the British
government realized that immigration had led to a large diversity within the country and
the new problem was incorporating minority groups into a multiracial and multicultural
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society.160 The incorporation of multiculturalism in the UK in the 1980’s, reflected a
society trying to address the needs of the growing minority populations whilst attempting
to figure out how a multicultural model would work. It is noteworthy that the 1988
Immigration Act, which removed the rights of New Commonwealth citizens to bring over
their spouses,161 demonstrates a realization in the shift of political issues.
In the case of the UK, multiculturalism was a strategy aimed at the immigrant
populations, it was not for the nation as whole,162 which might have contributed to its
demise in the later decades. Official multiculturalism in Britain was established in a
laissez-faire way, where it was instituted in some branches of state and ignored in
others.163 Moreover, Britain aimed to become a “community of communities”, where
people were encouraged to practice their cultures in the delegated spot of the private
sphere (in their private lives or their communities).164 The public sphere remained with a
single political culture.165
What intensified the problems of diversity was the ongoing economic malaise.
There was large scale unemployment and few future prospects for a lot of the British
youth, which in some cases was manifested in the white youth as an inclination towards
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extreme right-wing groups and racists agendas.166 On the other hand, the minority groups
which had been increasing since the late 1940s were no longer grateful immigrants
seeking labour; there was a new generation of youth, born and raised in Britain.167
Unemployment hit Muslims the hardest; they also had the least educational qualifications
and highest numbers in manual work.168 Along with these troubles, they were amongst
those most likely to be targeted for attacks on person and to property, as well as those
living in the worst housing conditions.169 Thus, the new generation of Muslim youth
faced a more profound social and identity dilemma. They were the fruits of both cultures;
they retained the culture which they received at home from their parents and the
dominant British culture in which they grew.
The alienation felt by this generation of youth was even higher than the one for
their parents; they experienced institutional racism from almost all parts of society such
as, education, employment, housing and the media.170 This led them to believe that they
could not belong in British culture, regardless of their efforts. The rejection from
mainstream society resulted in some of these youths turning towards more orthodox and
extreme forms of Islam for answers.171 This can also be seen as a form of resistance
against the society in which they wished to belong, but were made to feel as if they did
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not. Since identity is formed through differences,172 these youths fell back on what
emphasized and exaggerated their difference when they reconstructed their identity
against the collective. In essence, it was merely a struggle to find a place in society.
The Rushdie affair came in the wake of the OPEC oil crisis and the Iranian
Revolution, whilst the 1980s economic struggles, marking a grand transition in the
perception of Muslims in the UK. Salman Rushdie’s ridiculing of the Prophet
Mohammed in the novel The Satanic Verses produced a massively negative reaction from
the Muslim communities. Muslim protesters took to the streets to burn copies of the
book. Poynting and Mason argue that the protestors were hoping for public support,173 in
what they felt was disrespect towards their beliefs and culture, however, the result was
quite the opposite. Images of angry Muslims burning books were televised all over the
world, and this was likened to images of Nazis or the Inquisition.174 These protests took a
global turn when they were mirrored in other cities such as Johannesburg, Bombay and
Islamabad, and gained an even bigger significance when the Iranian Leader called for a
fatwa,175 to the global Muslim community, asking for the death of Rushdie.176
The result of this affair was a demonstration in a clash of cultures. Western critics
were astounded at what they felt was an attack on the freedom of speech, with some well-
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known people commenting on how Muslims appeared repulsive and backwards.177
Within the UK, the perception of Muslims completely changed, they were now seen as
potentially dangerous and uninterested in British values.178 At the same time, the Muslim
communities in the West experienced a similar distaste; translating the reactions of the
West to mean they were not interested in understanding why Muslims would be
offended.179 Muslims became targeted as threats and ‘strangers within’. It had become a
grand moment of collision and hostility, which contributed to the increase in
Islamophobia.
Subsequently, the Gulf War of 1991 occurred before the Rushdie incident had a
chance to cool down. The Gulf War positioned the British state against the Muslims. This
was because the British government became part of the effort against a Muslim country.
Even though Britain’s role in the effort required cooperating with Arab Muslim countries
in order to bring liberation to an Arab Muslim country, it resulted in a vast divide within
the British population.180 Muslims within the UK were asked to prove their loyalty to
Britain.181 It is interesting to note that anti-war sentiments expressed by white British folk
were legitimized; however, a Muslim expressing anti-war sentiment was viewed as antiBritish.182 This atmosphere of fear and hostility escalated to attacks on Muslims residing
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in Britain and imprisonment of some of them on the grounds that they were a ‘threat’ to
national security.183
The important role of the media in these debacles, and those that followed cannot
be underemphasized. Following the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War, coverage of
Muslims grew, along with an interest in Islam in the media.184 After these events new
racist terminology entered the media and the negative portrayal of Muslims escalated.185
For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were represented as, “separatist,
insular and unwilling to integrate with the rest of society,” in the British media.186 This
further contributed to creating a singular image of Islam and Muslims as the ‘other’ and a
threat to Western societies, which further demonstrates the escalation of Islamophobia.
It is well known that the media has the power to represent the world in any
specific way.187 The media is ruled by those who are the primary definers of what is
classified as news and the ‘correct’ version of it.188 It does not acknowledge that there is
usually more than a single perspective on the meaning of an event.189 Furthermore, within
the case of the UK, the media and its portrayal of immigration issues as race issues was
seen in several studies; thus racism was the problem with race relations in the UK and its
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media.190 Historically, ‘race’ in the British media has been portrayed as an ‘external
threat’ in relation to fears of immigration,191 which has continued on to today and has
contributed to Brexit.
7/7 London Bombings
The 1990s in Britain was a time when race relations became even more important.
There was an intensification of inequalities experienced by the minority groups, such as
the Muslims and a growth in hatred, which led to violent reactions in later years. This
section of the paper will analyze the 7/7 London bombings; the significance of how they
brought the fear of security ‘home’ and demonstrated how Britain had failed to grow a
sense of Britishness in its Muslim youth. Subsequently, the apparent failure of the
multicultural model in the UK will be discussed.
It is without a doubt that the post-9/11 climate around the world has been a
“pervasive culture of risk and insecurity,” which has shaped into, “Islamophobic and
discriminating attitudes which cast a shadow on Muslims and further their resentment,
thus playing into the hands of the radical political propaganda.”192 The events of 9/11
have created an atmosphere of fear linked to terrorism, which in turn, is linked directly to
Islam. This has led to a plethora of institutionalized Islamophobia, both in the UK and
elsewhere.193
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The London train bombings of July 2005, later referred to as 7/7, were a series of
attacks on the London transport system by British-born Muslim men.194 Coming at the
wake of 9/11, the events of 7/7 very much brought the issues over security ‘home’. The
results of these events were two-fold; not only did they exacerbate the Islamophobic
attitudes, they also suggested a clear rejection of Britishness from some of the Muslims
‘within’. Coming on top of an already established history of rising Islamophobia within
the UK and a lack of acceptance towards Muslims; 7/7 in the post-9/11 climate,
demonstrates the failure in British multiculturalism and integration efforts. Moreover, 7/7
is especially significant because it increased the suspicions of threat coming from the
Muslims living in the UK and suggested an inherent lack of assimilation between Muslim
and British values. Thus, further alienating and ‘othering’ Muslim communities.
Furthermore, issues over immigration continued to be a major concern throughout
the 1990s, with civil wars all over the world and asylum seekers trying to gain entry into
the UK. Refugees were coming from places such as, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and
Somaliland, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kurds from Turkey and Zimbabwe.195
Paralleling the concerns over immigration was a growth in racism. Violence within the
UK towards ethnic minorities had only grown over the 1990s. This can be demonstrated
in the 1997 Human Rights Watch report, which indicated that the UK had one of the
highest levels of racially motivated violence and harassment, having risen 275% between
the years 1989 and 1996.196 Moreover, the report indicated that the problem was
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projected to worsen in the following years.197 However, for a long period of time Britain
suffered from codifying and thus, potentially denying the existence of racism within the
country. This occurred through a process of referring to racism as ‘race relations’. Acts
and institutions were created to improve, what was called ‘race relations,’ although
perhaps the problem would have been better represented had they been called ‘antiracism’.
Failures in properly addressing racism resulted in the eventual downfall of the
multicultural framework within Britain. Other concerns such as the rise in Islamophobia,
security threats, and the ever present contentions over identity aided this demise. The
race-riots of 2001 in various English cities, along with the events of 7/7, highlight the
ongoing problem with race that multicultural policies had not been able to rectify. What
came out of the reports following these riots demonstrate that in order to allow minorities
to observe their own cultures, Britain had gathered ethnic groups into private
communities and separated them from mainstream Britishness. Thus, there was no
connection between the identity one held within their own ethnic group, and one they
held within the nation; national identity remained singular. Moreover, public debates
continually failed to properly address issues in race, religion and culture.198 As Connolly
states, “If you are marginalized, stigmatized, vilified, or excluded by public
identifications inscribed upon you, and if these identifications are somehow fundamental
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to the integrity of collective identity, the politics of identity puts you in double
jeopardy.”199
Thus, the collective identity is the hegemony of a singular idea and set of traits
that inherently have certain exclusionary characteristics. If one belongs to the groups that
are excluded from definitions of collective identity then one’s freedom is impinged upon
and they are secluded from the collective. Since the state is the official center prescribing
collective action, it is also responsible for constructing the collective identity with the aid
of its institutions. Therefore, the state defines, “the most fundamental division between
inside and outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, the sphere of citizen entitlements
and that of strategic responses.”200 In the case of Britain, Muslim groups had continually
been excluded from the collective identity of the nation as a whole, which even
multiculturalism could not properly remedy. This was because the collective identity of
Britishness did not experience a large transformation. The framework of multiculturalism
was aimed at the immigrant groups. Thus, it was recognized that they had their own
culture, which the liberal state admitted they should be able to practice. However, this did
not translate into giving them a place within the national identity; instead, it allowed them
to form their own separate collective identities away from the national collective.
Although, it should be noted that some scholars have argued that Britain’s imperial past
and island mentality has made them more tolerant to diversity than other European
nations,201 which can be seen in their attempts to adopt multicultural policies, initial
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endeavours in giving citizenship rights to Commonwealth citizens, and accepting the
presence of robust public debate surrounding multiculturalism within Britain.
Nevertheless, more tolerance does not equate to more acceptance.
Conclusion
The ongoing fears of immigrants and the heightened levels of Islamophobia
(because of a classification of Muslims as the ‘other’, growing conflicts in the Middle
East, violence perpetrated by extremist Muslim groups all over Europe, and within the
UK, and intensified media exposure of these issues) have led to a failure in
multiculturalism and failure in the acceptance of diversity within Britain. This was
demonstrated through the original construction of British nationalism, which was built on
conquests and the exceptionalism of the English identity. These identity struggles were
seen over and over again in the British case. Although, it should be noted that because the
British nation was created with the coming together of several other nations (Welsh,
Scottish and Irish) and they have retained a separate identity for themselves, there is a
regional identity distinction that can be made. The English identity remains more
exclusive than, for example, the Welsh identity in terms of creating a space for ethnic
minorities to belong. Scholars have argued that there is more acceptance towards ethnic
groups in the regions outside of England.202 For instance, studies show that a Muslim
living in Scotland readily identifies as Scottish, as opposed to British.203 However, the
English identity continues to “lay claim” on everything that encompasses Britain;204
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including, ‘Britishness’. Therefore, it can be said that, in a sense, Muslims remain
ostracized from attaining true Britishness.
From the OPEC oil crisis to the Rushdie affair, issues over clashing cultures and
violence have shown an escalation. This has resulted in the rejection of British identity
and the British multicultural model from the Muslim youth who deeply felt a lack of
belonging in the country in which they were born. The struggle was only worsened by
Middle Eastern wars and the British involvement in them, such as the Gulf War of 1991.
Moreover, post 9/11 and 7/7 atmosphere of homegrown terrorism has placed the blame of
a lack of integration on the failure of multiculturalism.205 This line of argument intones
that multiculturalism has failed to be inclusionary enough and for that, Britain is to
blame. However, this might be too simplistic of a correlation to make.206 Although,
immigration remains a hot topic within the UK and differences are still seen as a lack of
integration. Thus, minorities, such as the Muslims, remain at the center of social
problems. As Poole argues, “The liberal response to Islam reveals a level of intolerance
not found in other minority groups.”207
There has been much scholarly debate on the presence of religion in the public
sphere in Western societies, and how it does not have a place to belong.208 It has been
argued that the nature of Muslim acceptance in European countries, such as Britain, is
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inherently problematic because their identity is based on their religion.209 However, being
identified based on their religion is not a conscious and active choice made by the
Muslim populations in these places; it is Western society that defines them as such and
then confines them into a system that is reluctant to see them in a different light. This is
part of a larger problem of Islamophobia, which contributes to the exclusionary attitudes
of Europeans towards the Muslims living in Europe.
The British case has repeatedly demonstrated that although there has been much
debate over the place of diversity within British culture and identity, acceptance has been
lacking. The steps that were made towards integration and plural understanding of British
society have currently taken a step backwards. With Brexit, a move towards right-wing
politics and potential disintegration of the UK into even smaller pieces, the positive
outlook on multiculturalism is dismantling.
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CHAPTER 3:
France, Laïcité and Islam
Following the attack on one of the most famous streets in Paris close to the end of
the recent French elections in the spring of 2017, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the
National Front party, made an unsettling, yet not uncommon, speech addressing the
prominence of security concerns in France; “L’islam radical défie nos valeurs et notre
force d’âme [Radical Islam defies our values and our strength of soul].”210 This comment
emphasizes the place of Islam as the ‘other’ that does not belong within French identity,
as well as, nodding to a Catholic tradition with the phrase ‘force d’âme’211. Therefore, Le
Pen’s statement has a dual effect; it rejects Islam, and thus Muslims, from partaking in
French identity found in both the post-revolutionary France and in the ancien regime.
That is to say, both modern secularism and traditional French ties to Catholicism. Le Pen
is alluding to a nationalism that joins the past, present and future of France as connected
to one another and indivisible; thus refuting the position of diversity in possibly changing
that.
Issues relating to security and identity of the Muslim population are ever more a
growing concern within France. Not only does France host the highest number of
Muslims within Europe, it has also been one of the least accommodating towards ethnic
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minorities.212 Issues over national identity and the integration of diversity have not been
present in French discourse for as long as it has been in the UK. Moreover, a framework
of ‘multiculturalism’ has never existed in France. Instead dealing with diversity has
occurred through the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘integration’, both of which come
under laïcité.213
This chapter will analyze how the French have responded to a rise in diversity,
especially with regards to their Muslim population, whilst a rise in Islamophobia has
occurred. This will be done through the analysis of certain significant laws and events
that have had a major impact on the Muslims residing in France. This chapter will not be
as historically linear in the development of analysis as the previous chapter due to the fact
that the French case exhibits certain recurring concepts, which are better analyzed in
groups rather than in a linear fashion. Firstly, the construction of laïcité and French
notions of nationalism will be conceptualized and how it has coloured the experience of
the Muslims in France will be laid out. Followed by an analysis of the head scarf scandal
of 1989 and how it has been exacerbated with the aid of the media. Lastly, the 2005
suburban youth riots in France will be examined under the context of rising Islamophobia
due to conflicts in the Middle East and within and the failure in integrative frameworks.
Thus, this chapter will argue that France’s dependence on secularism has delayed the
discourse on pluralism within the nation and contributed to limitations in the acceptance
of diversity.
Laïcité and Nationalism in France
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This section of the paper will firstly, trace the conceptions of nationalism and
citizenship in France. Subsequently, the impact of this conception of nationhood on the
construction of the concept of laïcité will be analyzed. This will be done with a focus on
the 1905 Law on secularism. Followed by a brief overview of how these concepts have
affected citizenship and immigration. Although, direct translation and definition of laïcité
is difficult to make, some scholars have defined it as ‘secularism’ and ‘secularity’.214 It
will be further defined throughout this section with a historical analysis of its origins.
The modern French sense of nationhood can be traced back to the French
Revolution of 1789. Coming out of the Enlightenment values, “the Revolution
established the nation as a voluntary association or contract between free individuals.”215
Thus the Republican concept of nationhood has come from putting an emphasis on the
sovereignty of the people.216 This conceptualization of the nation as ‘une et indivisible’
(one and indivisible) was created to combat the ruling of the monarchy and the
aristocracy.217 Moreover, the focus on unity has assimilated with ideas of ‘homogeneity’
and ‘uniformity’. Thus, the view of the nation as a united and uniform collective came
from this fundamentally important period in the construction of the French identity. In
this light, indivisibility and unity is also at the core of the French idea of citizenship.
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The focus on uniformity in the French understanding of the nation and citizenship
has led to problematic results for immigrants to France. According to this
conceptualization, some historians argue that the role of immigration in the development
of French society has largely been ignored by French history.218 Since the historiography
of France has placed a prominence on the homogeneity of the nation rather than its
differences, this has advised its ideas of assimilation, uniformity and universality.219
Thus, creating an atmosphere where differences arising from region, ethnicity and other
factors could be masked.220 Subsequently, discourse on immigration has been constructed
as a phenomenon exterior to the history of the French, as opposed to, an internal problem
which has been developing within French history.221
The conceptualization of laïcité is linked strongly to the ideas of citizenship.
French secularism can be traced back to the 1801 Concordat, in which the church was
placed in the hands of the state. Historically, the results of this could best be seen in the
French education system. Out of all the other European countries, France remains the
only country with no religious education in public schools (with the exception of the
Alsace-Moselle region).222 This separation was further endorsed and defined in the 1905
Law on séparation, which replaced the 1801 Concordat. This law made the relationship
between the state and all religions crystal clear by declaring that the State would not
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“recognize, finance or subsidize” any religion.223 It is important to note that the 1905 Law
placed an emphasis on ‘religions’ instead of ‘the church’, which indicates the intent was
to reinforce the French belief in secularism to the core.
Since its establishment, the 1905 Law has acquired a cultural significance in
France; it is seen to embody the Republican and national principles in laïcité and unité.
As it has lasted the constitutions of 1940, 1945 and 1946, in a sense, it is even stronger
than the most current constitution.224 The 1958 Constitution, which is still in effect today,
further defined the country with the terms ‘one’ and ‘indivisible’. Reinforcing the
separation between the state and religion. Although, it should be noted that this law has
not always been upheld strictly. It seems as if there has been some favouritism shown,
majority of the time, to Catholics. This could be demonstrated in the Alsace-Moselle
region retaining a religious education in their public schools on the grounds that the
region was incorporated into France after the law was passed (it was part of Germany
before).225 Moreover, the French government chooses to subsidize some private schools,
with most of the chosen ones being Roman Catholic.226 Although, the state has also
subsidized the building of a Grand Mosque in Paris, which should not to be
overlooked.227
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The focus on French secularism and indivisibility has led to assimilationist
tendencies towards immigrant groups. However, historical expectations of assimilation
has been presented as a paradox. At the heart of assimilation is the idea that the national
community, in this case France, must supersede all other identities.228 Thus, promoting
the concept that every newcomer must be like the French, whilst also exclaiming that
French identity has been culturally constructed through a shared history and unity,
meaning no outsider could ever truly be French.229 This can further be seen in the official
French category for the étranger (foreigner), which includes a vast number of nonimmigrants, such as the children born in France to immigrants parents who have not yet
acquired full French nationality.230 Silverman further argues that, although this is the
official terminology, within popular political discourse the term ‘foreigner’ is readily
confused with the term ‘immigrant’. He goes on the claim that in contemporary French
public discourse, the term ‘immigrant’ has been used to address visible minorities, most
especially those of North African descent.231 Within the ideological underpinnings of
French society (the reflections of which can be seen in the terminology on ‘foreigners’
and ‘immigrants’) there is an indication that assimilation has failed; both in terms of the
acceptance of visible minorities such as the Muslims, and from the perspective of the
minorities’ who feel rejected from French culture. This has become even more apparent
with the French reactions to some pivotal events and the creation of certain laws which
have directly targeting specific ethno-religious groups.
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Although this paper will focus on immigration after World War II, a significant
number of foreigners had been in France since before that period. This can be
demonstrated with the 1851 census which provided statistics on the number of foreigners
in France at the time,232 thus clearly, indicating that there was enough of a visible number
of outsiders that a census was deemed necessary. Immigrants to France were generally
seen as temporary contract workers, arriving just to fill a labour gap.233 Even though the
naturalization law of 1889 projected to make ‘Frenchmen’ from foreigners, which comes
in contrast to the economic view of immigrants.234 From this perspective France could be
seen as showing more initial openness to immigrants, as they were readily accepted into
the Republic as workers. Immigrants helped with the amount of labour that was required
to allow France to sustain its economic growth during these years.235 Thus, these
contradictions indicate a confusion over immigration issues since the beginning.
The Headscarf Scandals
In the immediate postwar period France was open to immigration from various
countries of origin, as previously stated, to fill labour shortages. However, the main
recruits were arriving from other European countries. This can be seen in the 1945
Ordinances, which outlined that immigrants would not be selected based on their
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countries of origin.236 This section of the paper will firstly, lay an overview of how
immigration issues evolved and created the background for the headscarf scandal of
1989, followed by an analysis of the scandal with regards to the media’s role in
intensifying it. Modern conceptions of problems arising from immigration in France
started after the 1960s, precisely after the Algerian War. Therefore, controversies over
immigration are a product of decolonization and the long lasting Algerian War, which
created, “ethnic and racial fault lines in French society that persist today.”237 Since the
postwar period, policies pursued by the French state have tried to dissuade immigration,
in particular, they wanted the North Africans to return to their countries of origin.238 This
could be seen in the ambiguous status of immigrants from North and West Africa. The
Evian Agreements, which provided Algeria with independence in 1962, nevertheless,
kept their colonial status as ‘citizens’ unchanged.239 This status allowed Algerians to
move freely within France. Thus, leading to acceleration in the arrival of thousands of
Algerians into France in the late 1960s, which encountered tighter French controls. Other
former French colonies in Africa also provided a lot of immigrants in this time period.240
The 1970s was a time of economic downfall, and a period when the French
government was trying to figure out how to better control the rising tide of immigration.
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The open immigration regime held until the 1973-1974 OPEC oil crisis,241 which further
led France towards an economic recession. After which the government tried to organize
better control over worker and family immigration. This led to an immigration stop in
1974, however, family reunification continued.242 Economic downfall and unemployment
rates also contributed to a rise in xenophobia.243 During this period, the relations between
the French state and the Muslim populations has been classified as toleration and minimal
accommodation.244
Immigration became a large topic of concern in the 1980s, and started a dialogue
on discussions of citizenship and nationality. The government finally recognized the vast
amount of immigrants that had settled in France and acknowledged that policy and the
state had to address them more directly. Muslims in particular, stood out, as there was 5
million from North African origins.245 Moreover, Muslim populations were experiencing
considerable disadvantages and were disproportionately affected by the economic strains.
This can be seen in the children of North African migrants that lived in the suburbs
suffering from high rates of unemployment, insufficient prayer spaces and no
representation in the National Assembly.246 Furthermore, 1981 March for Equality and
Against Racism was the first large-scale call for civil rights and was organized by the
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second-generation youth.247 Thus, leading the government in constructing a “proactive
state support for the emergence of an Islam de (of) France.”248
Although the recognition of Muslim communities and the need to address their
needs was a positive move towards addressing the growing diversity in France, it came
under heavy difficulties. This was due to a legal and social bind in the separation of the
state and religion. Thus, trying to institutionalize and provide for the needs of the Muslim
communities reignited the discussions around the place of religion in French society.
Religion is especially significant in the French case because addressing diversity in
French society from the point of view of citizenship or race and ethnicity was rejected.249
Thus, with these discussions in mind, France moved towards policies of
integration of immigrant populations. It is within this background that the ‘headscarf
affair’ of 1989 erupted. In essence, this affair was the expulsion of three Muslim students
from a public school in Creil, due to the fact that they refused to remove their
headscarves. The head teacher at the school asserted that their refusal was a direct attack
on the principles of laïcité, which were at the core of the Republic. As this was an issue
with only 3 pupils at a small school in Creil it would not have been a huge national affair
had it not been for the role of the media. In an atmosphere of immigration and integration
issues and with right wing politics on the rise, this affair received wide attention.
Not only did this affair confirm a clash of cultures between the Muslims and the
French, it also contributed to a view of Muslims as the alien ‘other’ which did not belong
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in France. The culture of Muslims, especially with regards to the headscarf, was seen as
sexist and archaic, thus, not fitting the French ideals of liberty and equality. Connolly
argues that the state responds to alienated and fragmented identities within it by
intensifying efforts to create unity.250 In this way, the state tries to establish a standard for
normality. However, creating these pressures results in an expansion of abnormality and
fragmentation.251 This was demonstrated in French politics and governance in the
aftermath of the head scarf scandal. The slow contribution of this affair to the rise of
Islamophobia could be seen in the rise of the right wing National Front party, which
campaigned with the slogans claiming to end, “the colonization of France by Arab
immigrants.”252 The government reacted to the rise of the National Front and the
headscarf affair in 1989, by changing their soft assimilationist approach with a stronger
assertion of integrationist plans. This could be demonstrated with the establishment of the
High Council on Immigration, which would focus on developing integration goals and
policies.253
Similar laws restricting and, most specifically, targeting Muslims have come into
effect in later years, Such as the 2004 prohibition on religious symbols in public schools,
also referred to as the Headscarf Ban, and the 2011 Burqa Ban, which are still in effect
today. As well as the most recent 2016 Burkini Ban, which was later declared illegal by
the court. These laws demonstrate the ongoing and repetitive nature, in the struggle for
French society and state, to accept the rights of the Muslim communities in expressing
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and practicing their religion as they choose. To contrast, some scholars have argued that
the discussion surrounding laws such as the 2004 prohibition on religious symbols are
more often constructed on a binary framework which overlooks the institutional efforts to
make more infrastructures available to Muslims. For instance, the opening of private
Muslim schools.254 Although, the creation of more separate spaces for Muslims does not
necessarily meet the requirements of a society, which needs to change its framework on
where diversity can belong. Isolating certain groups from the mainstream only aids the
further alienation of them from partaking in the collective identity. This arises from a
paradox in France with regards to managing its Muslim population. Although, France
officially institutionalized Islam in 2003; there is still a dynamic of trying to emancipate
Muslims from their culture and religion.255 This is due to the fact that Islam is still feared
and viewed as despotic and primitive within secular French ideology and culture.
2005 Riots
The effects of 9/11 were experienced all over the world. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the atmosphere of Islamophobia it created was observed everywhere.
For the French case, the Muslim populations which had been seen as hostile to
assimilation became perceived as more and more hostile towards society. This prompted
the state to create more avenues to recognize and include Muslims in the national
community. This can be seen in the establishment of the Conseil Français du Culte
Musulman (CFCM) in 2003, which marked the official institutionalization of Islam in
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France. Moreover, it was also made to combat rising levels of religious extremism.256
Thus, displaying the rising level of fear directed at Islam within France. This section of
the paper will outline the issues between the Muslim and Jewish communities that have
been affected by the conflict in the Middle East. Subsequently, there will be a focus on
the impact of the 2005 Riots, with the results of it seen in the new conceptualization of
‘diversity’ within France.
Concurrent to the struggle of Muslim populations to integrate into French society,
there has been an ongoing internal friction between the Muslim and Jewish populations.
Not only are the Muslim and Jewish communities the largest two ethno-religious groups
within France, France also holds the largest amount of Muslim and Jewish populations
living together (outside of Israel).257 Although the Muslim population is proportionally
larger.258 Prominent scholars, such as Mandel, have argued that the polarization between
these groups have a complex history, however, one of the greatest contributing factors is
the Arab-Israeli conflict happening in the Middle East.259 This has resulted in continuous
distaste between the communities, especially increasing after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Minor strife could be seen in the student protests following the war, and again in the
tensions following the Gulf War in the 1980s,260 and since then, in other instances such as
the violence against Jews perpetrated by Arab youth in the autumn of 2000. The tensions
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between these groups have predominantly been caused by conflict in the Middle East and
have enforced a negative perception of Muslims and their lack of ability to let go of
fraternities outside of France, thus, demonstrating a lack of assimilability.
However, the threat of Muslims to the people of France became even more
profound and gripped the attention of the public after the riots in 2005. These riots started
just a few months after, and within the same year, of the London bombings. Thus,
drawing the potential of violence closer to home until it finally erupted in the French
banlieues (suburbs). The riots were perpetrated by the second-generation youth of
immigrant backgrounds. It involved arson on cars and public buildings. These riots
resulted in many changes, both on the discourse surrounding ethnicity and the perception
of Muslims in France. They demonstrated an accumulation of discrimination and
marginalization felt by the Muslim youth for years.
The political response to these riots was that there was a “deep malaise”, within
French society.261 Second and even third generation immigrants still did not feel as if
they belonged. Assimilation and integration strategies had clearly failed to some extent. It
has been argued by many scholars that France is ‘colour-blind’, that is to say, public
discourse was not as open to discussions around ethnicity and race. There has been many
restrictions on measuring diversity in French legislation.262 Moreover, throughout the
1980s and 1990s racial problems were obscured by social euphemisms.263 Ignoring the
racial problem has created paradoxes with the French attitude on diversity issues. It has
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also not helped with research and policy development. This ambivalence has been
prominent in French politics for decades. As it has been demonstrated throughout this
chapter, France has had a growing diversity for a long period of time, regardless of this
fact there is no direct recognition and framework for addressing ‘race’ the way there was
in Britain. The word ‘diversity’ itself, only enters the lexicon after the 2005 riots.264 Thus,
it is the impact of these riots which helps both the state and the society realize more
strongly that there is inequality and dissatisfaction within minority ethnic groups in
France. More specifically, it brings ‘ethnicity’ to the foreground of discussions. As
Nicholas Sarkozy remarks, “[the rioters] are legally fully French. But let’s say things as
they are: polygamy and acculturation of a certain number of families means that is more
difficult to integrate a young person originating from Sub-Saharan Africa than it is a
young French person from another origin.”265
The acceptance that there was diversity within French culture widened the
discussion about how to manage it. This brought forth new conceptualizations of laïcité.
It was argued that a new perspective on laïcité could help France cope with its
multicultural nature. This was explained by some scholars as laïcité plurielle, which
acknowledged the plural nature of French society while trying to unify it. The Stasi
Report of 2003 declared the presence of a new laïcité in France, which Sarkozy claimed
would defend state support for building religious infrastructure.266 Although, after the
2005 riots the intellectual and public debate in France surrounding laïcité plurielle turned
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sour. This can be seen in the arguments of the philosopher and historian, Pierre-André
Taguieff. As Kiwan argues, Taguieff’s earlier work focused on anti-racism and the cult of
cultural difference, whereas in the post-riot era he declared a more hardened stance on the
issues of diversity.267 He said that new plural visions of laïcité were ‘hyperpluralism’ and
‘hypertolerance’, which impeded on true liberalism in Western societies.268 Taguieff
further argued that only the true laïcité could bridge the differences in society and
cultures, and in this way, he was espousing the continuation of the assimilationist
perspective.269 Moreover, Kiwan argues that Taguieff’s views reflected his fears of Islam
and Islamism within Europe.270
Conclusion
From the perspective of identity politics, it can be argued that the French reaction
and delays in addressing the concerns of Muslim population by relying on a notion of
their culture as secular and thus inherently opposed to religiosity, demonstrates the
fundamental flaw that exists in all cultures. As Connolly says, “Every culture seems to
contain some themes that are both indispensable to it and inherently problematic within
it.”271 Moreover, the indispensability of these characteristics lead to their concealment. 272
Thus, making it harder to realize and change their problematic nature. Within France, this
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notion has manifested itself in the strict conceptualization of laïcité and its protection in
society which is caused by its deeper connection to nationality and the identity of the
French. As the prominent philosopher, Charles Taylor, has argued there needs to be
redefinition of laïcité and secularism, because the current construction of it has been
contradictory and restrictive. Taylor argues that secularism endorses state neutrality and a
neutral state should avoid favouring at all costs.273 This means one religion cannot be
favoured over another; moreover non-religion cannot be favoured over religion. Proper
secularism should be the maintenance of absolute state neutrality.
In the French case, this would translate to not placing a tradition of Christianity
over the Muslim religion of the immigrant groups, as well as not championing nonbelief
over belief. All of which is to say there are clear imbalances and contradictions still very
much present in French society. As can be seen in the most recent events, such as Charlie
Hebdo of 2015 and the Burkini Ban of 2016. The Charlie Hebdo incident, similar to the
Rushdie affair of the UK, more profoundly demonstrated the continuing clash of cultures
that has, not only, remained unresolved but has worsened over time because of a
contribution of factors such as; increasing conflicts in the Middle East, rise in extreme
Islamic terrorism in the West, and the emphasis placed on these issues in the media.
Thus, upon deeper analysis, it begs to question whether complete state neutrality could
solve the problem of negligence and hostility felt by the Muslim communities that have
been directly disrupted by certain laws. Is it realistic to espouse an agenda that aims to
ignore differences in order to accept differences?
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In conclusion, this chapter has argued that France’s reliance on secularism has
delayed the discussion on pluralism and has been partly responsible for the lack of
acceptance of diversity that is still present within the French state. This has been done
through a discussion of the place of nationalism and laïcité within French identity and its
contribution to the understanding of citizenship and immigrants. Moreover, the headscarf
scandal of 1989 was discussed in length and how it portrayed a divided society was
shown. Finally, the 2005 riots were explained and their impact on the discourse and
lexicon surrounding diversity was demonstrated. Overall, the French case illustrates an
ongoing battle with competing identities and limiting frameworks that make the
acceptance of diversity even harder in the backdrop of an ever more challenging global
environment and hostility towards Islam and Muslims.
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CHAPTER 4:
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has illustrated a rise in identity politics over the years with the
concurrent rise of Islamophobia, which has led to a lack of acceptance towards diversity
within Europe, especially towards Europe’s Muslims. This was demonstrated with an
analysis of the case studies, UK and France. The UK has used a multicultural framework
to address its diversity which has been progressive, yet insufficient. This was contrasted
with the case of France. France has rejected the multicultural framework and instead
depended on their already rooted framework of secularism to deal with diversity, which
has shown to have clear limitations in accepting diverse groups.
For the case of the UK, it was demonstrated that a construction of British identity
and nationalism arose through an imperial mindset of conquest and superiority. As seen
in the original expansion of England towards Ireland and Scotland, and the resilient
exceptionality in the English identity, which has survived onto today, making it harder
for migrant groups to feel an acceptance within an English identity as opposed to a
Scottish identity. This identity framework has been applied to the immigrant groups
which came in the post-colonial, postwar period, and led to the construction of
multiculturalism. On the other hand, French nationality has been shown to be rooted in
the ideals obtained in the French Revolution. One of the strongest of which has been the
concept of unité, which contributed to the development of laïcité through later laws and
constitutions. Laïcité has grown to be a national ideal and a distinct part of French
identity. Thus, although diversity had been growing in France for some time, especially
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in the postcolonial period, France has asserted the framework of laïcité to assimilate its
diverse immigrant populations.
In the early immigration period there does not appear to be a specifically hostile
environment towards Muslims in Britain, they are alienated just like the other migrant
groups. However history in the rise of Islamophobia shows how the perception of
Muslims in particular has changed dramatically. One of the significant events which have
been a catalyst in this change has been the OPEC Oil Embargo, along with the general
distaste which came with the economic disparities of the time. After this incident, the
Muslims in the UK really stood out and became disliked members of society. This
perception later experienced a complete change after the Rushdie affair of 1989, which
demonstrated the length of difference between Muslim and British cultures. Moreover it
added to the growing landscape of Islamophobia with the use of the role of the media in
hyping this event. Rising levels of Islamophobia due to the media was also seen in France
with the headscarf scandal of 1989. The headscarf issue illustrated several faults within
French society, firstly, a lack of tolerance in the different practices of Muslims and
secondly, alienation and ostracizing of Muslims from mainstream French culture.
The perception of Muslims and their country of citizenship has also been affected
by conflict and wars happening in the Middle East, primarily through aiding a rise in
Islamophobia and creating fault lines between the host country and their countries of
origin (or affiliation through race or religion). This was demonstrated in the UK with the
Gulf War of 1991 and in France with the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Israelis. In
the case of the UK the Gulf War led to the alienation of Muslim groups and asked for
them to prove their alliance to Britishness as opposed to another identity; whereas, in
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France, the Arab-Israeli conflict was reflected in their Arab and Jewish populations,
which further portrayed Muslims as a violent group.
The peak in Islamophobia was observed after the events of 9/11, but more
profoundly after homegrown violence was perpetrated by the Muslims within the UK and
France. This was seen in the UK after the 7/7 attacks, which led to a questioning of the
multicultural framework that had been developing since the 1980s and its effectiveness.
On the other hand, in France violence was seen in 2005 as a reaction of Muslim youth to
being disadvantaged by the state. Moreover, it was only after these riots that a lexicon on
‘diversity’ really entered France. Until then there was minimal acceptance of the actual
amount of immigrant groups present in France. Although the acceptance of the vast
amount of diversity only aided the creation of further assimilationist and integrationist
frameworks. Thus, in comparison to the UK, France has shown a lag in accepting its
diversity; which demonstrates a denial within the French state and society towards both
the presence of a large number of Muslims and a need to create a competing mechanism
for including them within the French identity.
This is especially significant for the case of France, as it holds the highest number
of Muslims, and according to PEW Research Center, is projected to have the largest
growth in Muslim populations in the coming years, with the UK coming in second. To
have a better understanding for the reluctance to accept the Muslim populations in
Europe, a further analysis of how religion has been affected by secular and multicultural
frameworks is necessary. For the UK, there has been a tradition of internal religious
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plurality which has affected the relations between the state and the church.274 This has
contributed to the creation of multicultural, multi-religious, framework of tolerance. Even
if Islam has experienced an exclusion from this acceptance with the rise of Islamophobia,
the UK has benefitted from a history of trying to balance between the distinctiveness of
multiple cultures and subsections of Christianity. On the other hand, France has built its
identity over a culture of secularism and uniformity, which has resulted in little public
space for difference. This has created a public sphere which has disregarded the
differences of plural cultures and religions. Further explaining why it has taken France a
longer time than the UK to more actively accept and address its diversity.
The study of diversity and Islamophobia in Europe has opened up the valve to
identity politics and how best to address plurality. According to Connolly’s theory the
best way to combat difference in a society is to create an engagement between collective
and personal identities.275 As everyone has both a personal identity and a desire as
humans to belong to a collective identity.276 Thus, Connolly argues that the public sphere
should be where an open and free dialogue between the differences in collective and
personal identities can take place.277 Moreover, a harmonious identity cannot be created
by shunning difference in the place of neutrality. Therefore, neutrality in essence, is the
ignorance of the differences in identity and society. Thus, creating a paradoxical
relationship between identity and difference could be a way to solve diversity problems,
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in order for people, who do not belong in the hegemonized version of identity within a
culture, to feel a sense of acceptance with regards to their differences.
Overall, although the UK has shown a better mechanism to deal with difference,
latest trends in security and global affairs demonstrate that diversity is not as accepted as
it might have otherwise seemed. Moreover, the growth of nativist nationalism and rightwing politics indicates a move away from multicultural solidarity. It should be
emphasized that the rise of Islamophobia and the backlash towards diversity is a
multilayered and complex issue, which this paper has attempted to unwrap by examining
a combination of factors, some of which are: immigration, policy, economy, conflicts in
the Middle East and other major events. There is much more work that could be done in
this area. Later research in this field could focus on providing a more comprehensive
study of the perceptions of the actual public with regards to the Muslim populations, as
well as the perceptions of the Muslims with regards to feeling accepted. Further gaps
could be present between the opinion of the general population and the creation of public
policies.
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